On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.002zbMath1230.91091OpenAlexW2085000766MaRDI QIDQ634506

Nicola Pavoni, Sebastian Koehne, Árpád Ábrahám

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachlog-convexitymoral hazardhidden savings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (7)

Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach ⋮ Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance ⋮ Unemployment insurance with hidden savings ⋮ On the validity of the first-order approach with moral hazard and hidden assets ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans ⋮ Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function

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