Strategic argumentation
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Publication:634508
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017zbMath1247.91034OpenAlexW4230734276MaRDI QIDQ634508
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017
Related Items
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