On efficiency of the English auction

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.05.009zbMath1247.91071OpenAlexW3124125194MaRDI QIDQ634510

Sergei Izmalkov, Oleksii Birulin

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63940

zbMATH Keywords

English auctioninterdependent valuessingle-crossingefficient auctionex-post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders ⋮ English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem ⋮ Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices

Cites Work

• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
• An Efficient Auction
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

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