On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
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Publication:634516
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001zbMath1247.91058OpenAlexW1975693854MaRDI QIDQ634516
Johanna M. M. Goertz, François Maniquet
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2009_26.pdf
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Cites Work
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Large Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
