Minimal stable sets in tournaments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.004zbMath1247.91055arXiv0803.2138OpenAlexW2056670555MaRDI QIDQ634517

Felix Brandt

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2138

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysocial choice theorystable setstournament solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability ⋮ Feedback Vertex Sets in Tournaments ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
• Still more on the tournament equilibrium set
• Evaluation and decision models with multiple criteria. Stepping stones for the analyst.
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
• Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
• Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
• Non-cooperative games
• Feedback Vertex Sets in Tournaments
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Tournament games and positive tournaments
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

This page was built for publication: Minimal stable sets in tournaments