Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use

DOI10.1007/S11166-011-9120-6zbMath1219.91116OpenAlexW2169626893MaRDI QIDQ635931

Peter Zweifel, Christophe Courbage

Publication date: 25 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-011-9120-6

zbMATH Keywords

intergenerational moral hazardlong-term care insurancenursing home care

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (4)

On the characteristics of reporting ADL limitations and formal LTC usage across Europe ⋮ Long-Term Care Insurance Decisions ⋮ Old-age care prevalence in Switzerland: drivers and future development ⋮ Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard

Cites Work

• Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market
• Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships

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