Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation

DOI10.1007/s11750-009-0122-3zbMath1219.91010OpenAlexW2142361842MaRDI QIDQ636016

Juan J. Vidal-Puga, María Gómez-Rúa

Publication date: 25 August 2011

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.567.4681

zbMATH Keywords

valuebalanced per capita contributionslevel structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (15)

A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ Harsanyi support levels solutions ⋮ The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Games with nested constraints given by a level structure ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ The minimum cost shortest-path tree game ⋮ Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values ⋮ The Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values revisited ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE

Cites Work

• Implementation of the levels structure value
• On weighted Shapley values
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Weighted coalition structure values
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
• Weighted weak semivalues
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• A value for games with coalition structures
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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