Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0253-7zbMath1231.91118OpenAlexW2113435126MaRDI QIDQ637581

Kyle Hyndman

Publication date: 6 September 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0253-7

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingreference points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion

Cites Work

• Comparison utility in a growth model
• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
• Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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