The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods
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Publication:637583
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0255-5zbMath1231.91265OpenAlexW2051620431WikidataQ114018292 ScholiaQ114018292MaRDI QIDQ637583
Publication date: 6 September 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0255-5
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (1)
Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
Cites Work
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- Nearly serial sharing methods
- Ordinal cost sharing
- Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale
- Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
- Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
- Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
- Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
- On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
- Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
- Serial Cost Sharing
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
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