Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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Publication:639889
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0538-xzbMath1233.91202OpenAlexW3123464742MaRDI QIDQ639889
Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama
Publication date: 11 October 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0538-x
efficiencyindividual rationalityneutralityserial dictatorshipsecure implementationno-trade solutionsequential dictatorshipShapley-Scarf housing markets
Related Items
Secure implementation in allotment economies, Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values, Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values, Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities, An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions, Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems, Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects, Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
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