Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents
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Publication:639900
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0582-6zbMath1232.91474OpenAlexW2161283880MaRDI QIDQ639900
Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Marta Faias, Emma Moreno-García
Publication date: 11 October 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0582-6
Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (3)
Market games and Walrasian equilibria ⋮ An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies ⋮ Large market games, the law of one price, and market structure
Cites Work
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- Differential information economies: Introduction
- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
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