Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003zbMath1255.91055OpenAlexW3122822343MaRDI QIDQ643254

Yuichi Yamamoto, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9962008

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrepeated gamefolk theorembelief-free equilibriumpublic monitoringperfect public equilibriumex-post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Repeated coordination with private learning ⋮ Maximizing survival time in a random walk on an interval ⋮ Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

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