The robustness of robust implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011zbMath1255.91094OpenAlexW3125610068MaRDI QIDQ643278

Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.011

zbMATH Keywords

robust implementationsocial choice correspondencebelief-dependent outcomesex-post implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting ⋮ Locally robust contracts for moral hazard ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits

Cites Work

• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
• Continuous Implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Efficient Auctions
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• An Efficient Auction

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