Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.05.005zbMath1255.91226OpenAlexW1978076502MaRDI QIDQ643288

Roland Strausz, Daniel Krähmer

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designBlackwell's theoremsurplus extractioncorrelated information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Cites Work

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• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions

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