Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9zbMath1278.91078OpenAlexW1996348331MaRDI QIDQ645060

Giuseppe Lopomo, Peng Sun, Leslie M. Marx

Publication date: 8 November 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingmechanism designcartelbidding ring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement ⋮ Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret

Cites Work

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• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
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• Bidder collusion
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• Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion^*
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