Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.004zbMath1274.91173OpenAlexW1490147891MaRDI QIDQ645639

Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/297_v3.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

majority (Condorcet) winnerssingle crossing and intermediate preferencessingle peaked

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (18)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Majority judgment vs. majority rule ⋮ Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ Core-stable committees under restricted domains ⋮ Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles ⋮ A characterization of the single-crossing domain ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates ⋮ Reaching across the aisle to block reforms ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

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• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• On the existence of maximal elements
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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