Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.03.009zbMath1274.91096OpenAlexW2128171555MaRDI QIDQ645642

Michael Peters, Gorkem Celik

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcartel agreementsdefault game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with informational punishment ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining

Cites Work

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• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information

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