Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
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Publication:645647
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.006zbMath1274.91092OpenAlexW2106517091MaRDI QIDQ645647
Randolph Sloof, Thomas de Haan, Theo Offerman
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.006
Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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