Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
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Publication:645669
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.009zbMath1274.91240OpenAlexW2152792369MaRDI QIDQ645669
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.009
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
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