Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.007zbMath1274.91041OpenAlexW2029558281WikidataQ114015297 ScholiaQ114015297MaRDI QIDQ645673

Ori Haimanko, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik power indexsimple gamesefficiency axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index ⋮ Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Probabilistic spatial power indexes ⋮ The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity ⋮ Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties ⋮ An issue based power index ⋮ Indirect control and power in mutual control structures ⋮ Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices

Cites Work

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• Subjective evaluations of n-person games
• Utility functions for simple games
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

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