Expressive markets for donating to charities

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007zbMath1231.91112OpenAlexW2044326855MaRDI QIDQ646531

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities

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