A Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container security

DOI10.1007/s10479-010-0793-zzbMath1233.90057OpenAlexW2121597955MaRDI QIDQ646673

Niyazi Onur Bakır

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21865

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrisk analysisterrorismborder securitycontainer securityport security

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals ⋮ Static and dynamic resource allocation models for recovery of interdependent systems: application to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill ⋮ Competitive crowdfunding under asymmetric quality information ⋮ Espionage and the optimal standard of the customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT) program in maritime security ⋮ The role of customs in securing containerized global supply chains ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ A leader-follower partially observed, multiobjective Markov game

Cites Work

• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• A large‐scale linear programming model for finding optimal container inspection strategies
• Unnamed Item