Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

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Publication:646688

DOI10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6zbMath1225.90031OpenAlexW1965775355MaRDI QIDQ646688

Vicki M. Bier, Naraphorn Haphuriwat

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6




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