The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:647345
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0280-ZzbMath1233.91019OpenAlexW2063497812MaRDI QIDQ647345
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0280-z
Related Items (6)
A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games ⋮ Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem ⋮ The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games ⋮ Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
Cites Work
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Reduced games, consistency, and the core
- Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
- Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
- The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
- Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
