Structure of extreme correlated equilibria: A zero-sum example and its implications

DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0267-1zbMath1233.91051arXiv1002.0035OpenAlexW3102826264MaRDI QIDQ647346

Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman Ozdaglar, Noah D. Stein

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0035

zbMATH Keywords

extreme pointsergodic theorycorrelated equilibriapolynomial games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items

Correlated equilibria in continuous games: characterization and computation

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