Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0266-2zbMath1233.91035OpenAlexW1980116286MaRDI QIDQ647357

Philippe Solal, Jacques Durieu, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0266-2

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityevolutionary game theory\(p\)-dominancefictitious play process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

A characterization of stochastically stable networks ⋮ \(p\)-best response set ⋮ Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games ⋮ \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information ⋮ Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment

Cites Work

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• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• The Evolution of Conventions

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