On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games

DOI10.1007/s00224-010-9282-7zbMath1278.91012OpenAlexW4240401627MaRDI QIDQ647483

Felix Fischer, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein, Felix Brandt

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-010-9282-7

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityiterated weak dominanceconstant-sum gamessolutions concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (1)

The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies

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