Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
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Publication:647541
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0479-0zbMath1235.91062OpenAlexW2044854382MaRDI QIDQ647541
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0479-0
Related Items (7)
An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
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