Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
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Publication:647548
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0486-1zbMath1235.91152OpenAlexW2078183170MaRDI QIDQ647548
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0486-1
History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol ⋮ Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
Cites Work
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies
- The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
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