Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
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Publication:6488801
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.14648MaRDI QIDQ6488801
Publication date: 23 October 2023
Published in: The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
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