A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games

DOI10.1007/S10288-023-00538-4MaRDI QIDQ6489311

Dongshuang Hou, Yifan Feng, Weibin Han, Gen-Jiu Xu

Publication date: 21 April 2024

Published in: 4OR (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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