Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
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Publication:6491155
DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09955-7MaRDI QIDQ6491155
Publication date: 24 April 2024
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations
- Strategically Simple Mechanisms
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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