Criticality in games with multiple levels of approval

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0488-zzbMath1235.91013OpenAlexW2084664742MaRDI QIDQ649132

Sreejith Das

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0488-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games

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