A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0496-ZzbMath1235.91155OpenAlexW2081165607MaRDI QIDQ649134

Daniel F. Stone

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0496-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

This page was built for publication: A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research