The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0574-xzbMath1235.91017OpenAlexW2243466188MaRDI QIDQ649144

Robert Sugden, Ben McQuillin

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://github.com/ueaeco/working-papers/raw/master/papers/cbess/UEA-CBESS-09-15.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Implementation in strong core by codes of rights, Implementation via rights structures, Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures, Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Cites Work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result