Experiments with the traveler's dilemma: welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
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Publication:649152
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0577-7zbMath1235.91039OpenAlexW3021793588WikidataQ57399533 ScholiaQ57399533MaRDI QIDQ649152
Leonardo Becchetti, Luca Stanca, Kaushik Basu
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/08-07.pdf
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Cites Work
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