Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0584-8zbMath1235.91054OpenAlexW2116249082MaRDI QIDQ649159

Lars Ehlers, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0584-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model ⋮ Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets ⋮ Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Cites Work

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• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-Transitive Collective Preference under Simple Games
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule

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