Faulting Winternitz One-Time Signatures to Forge LMS, XMSS, or $$\text {SPHINCS}^{+}$$ Signatures
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Publication:6493412
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_24MaRDI QIDQ6493412
Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author, Alexander K. Wagner, Emanuele Strieder, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 26 April 2024
Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)
Cites Work
- XMSS and embedded systems. XMSS hardware accelerators for RISC-V
- Grafting trees: a fault attack against the SPHINCS framework
- ``Oops, I did it again -- security of one-time signatures under two-message attacks
- On the Security of the Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme
- Merkle Signatures with Virtually Unlimited Signature Capacity
- Security Evaluations beyond Computing Power
- W-OTS+ – Shorter Signatures for Hash-Based Signature Schemes
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