Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.016MaRDI QIDQ6494253

Ross Rheingans-Yoo

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingincentiveslarge markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Optimal truncation in matching markets
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Community Structure in Large Networks: Natural Cluster Sizes and the Absence of Large Well-Defined Clusters
• A random graph model for massive graphs
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
• Random Graphs

This page was built for publication: Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores