Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On rationalizability in games with private values
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Publication:6494258
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.003WikidataQ129651259 ScholiaQ129651259MaRDI QIDQ6494258
Publication date: 30 April 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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