Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.002MaRDI QIDQ6494262

Sándor Sóvágó, Ran I. Shorrer

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

market designschool choicedominated strategiescollege admissionspreference misrepresentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Self-selection in school choice
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• Attention Variation and Welfare: Theory and Evidence from a Tax Salience Experiment
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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