Beyond dominance and Nash: ranking equilibria by critical mass

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.011WikidataQ128650606 ScholiaQ128650606MaRDI QIDQ6494274

Ehud Kalai, Adam Tauman Kalai

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdominant strategy equilibriumsocial contractfaulty players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Fault tolerance in large games
• Fault-tolerant Computation in the Full Information Model
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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