Primarily about primaries

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104095WikidataQ128260077 ScholiaQ128260077MaRDI QIDQ6494383

Allan Borodin, Tyrone Strangway, Nisarg Shah, Omer Lev

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

distortionsimulationscomputational social choicevoting systemspartiesmulti-stage voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Voronoi Choice Games
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Network-Based Vertex Dissolution
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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