An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
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Publication:6498749
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111589MaRDI QIDQ6498749
Publication date: 7 May 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
social choice theoryCondorcet winnerresolvabilityimpossibility theoremCondorcet loserpositive involvement
Cites Work
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