On the optimal fixed-price mechanism in bilateral trade
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Publication:6499263
DOI10.1145/3564246.3585171MaRDI QIDQ6499263
Publication date: 8 May 2024
fixed-price mechanismlearning mechanisms with finitely many samplesmechanism design with limited informationwelfare maximization in bilateral trade
Cites Work
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