Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information
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Publication:649975
DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9197-4zbMath1274.91135OpenAlexW1975771941MaRDI QIDQ649975
Raphaël Giraud, Jean-Marc Tallon
Publication date: 25 November 2011
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00502781/file/GT_V4.pdf
Related Items (7)
Imprecise information and subjective belief ⋮ On risk aversion under fuzzy random data ⋮ Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences ⋮ Ellsberg games ⋮ Throwing good money after bad ⋮ Decision making in phantom spaces ⋮ Decision-making with partial information
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- Estimating ambiguity aversion in a portfolio choice experiment
- Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries1
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
- Ambiguity Without a State Space
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