Reasoning about social choice functions
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Publication:652736
DOI10.1007/s10992-011-9189-zzbMath1253.03044arXiv1102.3341OpenAlexW3101370440MaRDI QIDQ652736
Nicolas Troquard, Michael Wooldridge, Wiebe van der Hoek
Publication date: 15 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.3341
modal logicknowledge representationsocial choice theorypreferencesstrategy-proofnessstrategic ability
Related Items (7)
Algorithmic Decision Theory Meets Logic ⋮ Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover ⋮ Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic ⋮ First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation ⋮ Arrow's decisive coalitions ⋮ Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation ⋮ Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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