Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion

DOI10.3982/ECTA19107zbMATH Open1541.91036MaRDI QIDQ6536460

Piotr Dworczak, A. Pavan

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Hurwicz expected utility and subjective sources
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Persuading a pessimist: simplicity and robustness
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Competition in Persuasion
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
• Sequential persuasion
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
• Convex Functions on Convex Polytopes
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion

Related Items (2)

Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences

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