Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement

DOI10.3982/ecta16962zbMATH Open1541.9118MaRDI QIDQ6536462

Pierre Yared, Marina Halac

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private informationfiscal policydeficit biasenforcement constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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• Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement

Related Items (2)

Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement ⋮ Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games

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