A general framework for robust contracting models

DOI10.3982/ecta17386zbMATH Open1541.91141MaRDI QIDQ6536463

Daniel Walton, Gabriel Carroll

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessprincipal-agent problemlinear contractshierarchical contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• A general framework for robust contracting models

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